[CWitek]

I heard that there was some disagreement with my last blog post, so I thought that I ought to come over and join the conversation, because some of what was posted sort of ignored the real world.

Originally Posted by MakoMike

" However, there is absolutely nothing that would prevent a groundfisherman who sits on the New England Fishery Management Council from voting for measures that provide him—and every other groundfisherman in New England—a short term economic benefit even if it imperils the health of the stock in the long term."

Not true. The Magnesson- Stevens Act, which established the Councils requires that the councils immediately stop overfhing in any fishery and also requires the councils to develop a rebuilding plan for any species that is overfished that will rebuild the fishery to Maximum Sustainable yield within a specified time frame. NMFS overseas these requirements and they have rejected Council approved measures that NMFS feels would fail to meet these requirements.

The problem is, the New England Council never did get around to actually rebuilding many overfished stocks, nor did they always end overfishing.

That is because they were very careful to avoid the one tool that works to constrain fishermen's harvests--and incomes--which is the imposition of hard quotas that keep the boats tied up at the docks once such quotas are filled.

Instead, they used "input controls" such as days at sea, etc. They never capped harvest at all. Thus, enterprising fishermen, abetted by their colleagues on the Council who drafted plans that depended on such "soft" measures, could find ways to land large quantities of fish despite the restrictions. For example, if you ran a groundfish gillnet boat, your "days at sea" only counted when your boat was out fishing, even though you had nets out killing fish when your boat was in port. Combine that with the fact that the Council allowed the use of "fractional" days, rather than charging the boat with a full day any time it left the dock, and there was room for plenty of fish-far more than was biologically reasonable--to be killed.

Finally, the situation got so bad that catch shares, with their hard quotas, were imposed. Now you hear the fishermen crying even louder about the restrictions, because for the first time, if they kill too many fish--either in directed effort or as bycatch--their nets can't be set. It's something that should have happened a couple of decades ago, but thanks to fishermen on the Council who fought like tigers against any hard quotas at any time they were proposed, we have--or perhaps more properly, we don't have--today's cod fishery in the Gulf of Maine.

As for the ASMFC each state gets three members, one appointed by the Governor, which is almost invariably one of the leaders of that state's marine fishery authority. So that seat is given to an individual who is a state employee and has no possible conflict of interest. Another seat goes to a legislator from that states legislature who should have little or no conflicts. Since each state only gets one vote, the two state employees outweigh any possible conflict from the third member.

Not in the real world.

In the real world, the two appointees--the governor's appointee and the legislative appointee (who usually doesn't show up, but rather sends a proxy with industry ties) can outweigh the vote of the state's professional fisheries manager.

Let's look at the striped bass states, between Maine and North Carolina, to see who the governors actually appoint.

In Maine and Massachusetts, they appointed lobsternen, Stephen Train and William Adler, respectively. Adler, far from being the head of any state fishery authority, uses the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association for his mailing address, so yes, I think that there's some possibility of conflict there.

Otherwise, the governors' appointees are relatively benign, although in New Jersey, Tom Fote, who has long been tied to the Jersey Coast Anglers' Association, always tries to find a way to kill more fish, whatever the species; in New York, Emerson Hasbrouck is from Cornell Cooperative Extension, and tends to favor industry interests (he was asking questions that seemed intended to torpedo the one-year rebuilding plan at the Striped Bass Management Board meeting in October) and Virginia's rep, Catherine W. Davenport is, so far as I can tell, owns an interest in a boatyard, and has strong commercial ties. But others are scientists and former government biologists, so we can't complain too much there. But the governors' appointees, as a group, are anything but government employees, as Mike maintains.

It's the legislative appointees that create the problems, because most of the legislators don't show up, and give other folks their proxies. And those other folks often have very strong economic interests in the fisheries that they are supposed to manage "impartially".

Let's take a look at the May Striped Bass Management Board meeting, because we have an attendance sheet for that one, and see who was actually casting the votes.

Out of twelve states with legislative appointees, eight--fully two-thirds of those eligible--sent proxies. Now let's see who those proxies were.

New Hampshire sent Dennis Abbott, a former legislator who normally votes with the fish's interests in mind.

Rhode Island sent Capt. Rick Bellavance, a charter boat owner and head of the Rhode Island Party & Charter Boat Association. Clearly, we have financial interests represented there.

New York sent Pat Augustine, who was making his last appearance. Augustine is a former charter boat mate and rodbuilder, among other things, but doesn't currently make any money from fishing as far as I know. However, it should be noted that in October, New York's legislative rep sent Kathy Heinlein, who represents the Captree Boatmen's Association (made famous last year when one of their boats advertised withy a photo of the female deck hand standing knee-deep in big, dead stripers while the ad trumpeted "STRIPED BASs SLAUGHTER!"). So, again, we have financial interests represented.

New Jersey sent Capt. Adam Nowalsky, who was one of the folks who pushed to have 2-fish options included in Addendum IV. Once again, there are financial motivations.

Pennsylvania's legislative proxy was Metchell Feigenbaum, who owns the Delaware Valley Fish Company. Enough said.

Delaware's legislative rep sent Bernie Pankowski, a charter boat captain. Also has clear financial interest in the striped bass fishery.

Maryland went over to the commercial side, with its legislative rep giving his proxy to Russel Dize, a commercial fisherman--or "waterman" as they call them down there--who noted at the October meeting that he'd been a waterman for 55 years and never saw so many striped bass--and there were too many, because they were eating all of his blue crabs. So yes, money was talking again.

And North Carolina sent Mike Johnson, a wildlife consultant and "outfitter" from Dare County. Not quite sure what kind of "outfitter" he is, but there is at least the potential that some income comes from promiting recreational fishing (although, to be fair, he may be all ducks and deer).

But the bottom line is that the potential for actual conflict is quite real at ASMFC. Both the governors' appointees and the proxies of the legislative reps can and often do make money from the harvest of the same fish that they allegedly manage, making "impartial" decisions more an ideal than reality.

The state advisory boards, RIMFAC, and the NYMFAC are both advisory panels with no authority to do anything other than make recommendation.

True, but at least in New York, the statute requires that the Department of Environmental Conservation strongly consider the MRAC recommendations, and to explain in black and white, in the memo that accompanies the regulation, why the MRAC advice was not followed. So while it has not actual rulemaking power, the votes do have a significant impact on the outcome of the rulemaking process.

Sometimes I have a lot of problems with Charlie's logic, although we do agree on some things, but this is not one of them. Who is more capable of managing the fisheries other that those who spend time on the water? By his logic the technical committees and the Scientific and statistical committees, which basically drive all fishery management decisions should all be disqualified, because they have a direct interest in keeping their jobs, which is to manage the fisheries.

Who is more capable of managing the fisheries other than those who spend time on the water? The answer is, people who are indifferent to the outcome of the science, and are willing to either increase harvest or shut down a fishery based solely on objective interpretation of the data, without worrying about the impact of those decisions on their--or maybe more important, their friends' and relatives'--ability to pay next month's rent if the fishery is shut down. We already manage everything else--ducks are perhaps the best analogue, since they, too, are migratory--based solely on science and the US Fish & Wildlife Service's best judgment, without Councils and Commissions to write the management plan. Hunters can have input at the Flyway Council, but only with respect to whether a short season and larger bag limit, or longer season and smaller bag, etc. would be preferable. They have no input into the size of the harvest itself, which is as it should be.

Both the Councils and the Commission have advisory panels to inform the folks who vote. That is where the fishermen's input should occur. The folks who actually act on that input should not have a stake in the outcome.

I have said for a long time that we should be managing salt water fish in the same manner as we manage deer, ducks, grouse, yellow perch, etc. And that's by professional managers, not amateurs with an interest in the outcome. That way, we can place the emphasis where it needs to be--on the long-term health of the stock, not on the short-term economic concerns of the harvester.