Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act - By Nils Stlope
With final deliberations on the reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act postponed until September, this is an opportune time to clear up some of the deliberate misunderstandings that have been made part and parcel of this process.
The original legislation, introduced by Senator Warren Magnuson, became law back in 1976 with all of the good intentions in the world; to remove mostly unregulated foreign fishing from the United States' coastal waters and replace it with managed domestic effort. After thirty years, that legislation, know known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act, has been forced through a series of Jekyll and Hyde-like transformations that have turned it into the largest immediate threat facing U.S. fishermen.
To a very large extent this has been done through the expenditure of vast amounts of (so-called) charitable foundation dollars, most derived from "Big Oil." These dollars have been used to fund questionable research, buy mass media exposure, and influence federal administrators and legislators. These expenditures have amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars over the last ten or so years, and it appears as if this massive investment is on the verge of paying off, with participants in many of our most important fisheries fast approaching or at the point of financial ruin.
Why? That's an impossible question for anyone other than the people who sign those million dollar checks to answer, and we wouldn't venture a guess. But we will devote this and the next FishNet to an exploration of where recreational and commercial fishermen are today relative to fisheries management (or, as an increasing number of them would say, mismanagement) and how they've gotten there, supplying some helpful illustrations along the way.
Summer flounder - an example of how bad it's gotten
The summer flounder stock supports one of the most important fisheries in the mid-Atlantic region. Commercial landings were valued at $28 million in 2004, meaning the fishery generated well over $100 million in economic activity. The recreational fishery is a mainstay of the party/charter boat fleet, and summer flounder are the preferred species for the majority of recreational anglers in the region.
Over a decade ago fisheries scientists determined summer flounder weren't doing as well as they could have been. In light of this, stringent management measures were put in place. Both recreational and commercial fishermen adapted, accepting larger minimum sizes, abbreviated fishing seasons and decreased possession limits. Over a period of several years both the commercial and recreational harvests were reduced by well over 50%. Predictably, the stock responded positively. The management restrictions have been eased slightly and the harvest by both sectors has been inching up. This is the way fisheries management is supposed to work: fishermen, whether recreational or commercial, "tighten their belts," the management measures work and the fishermen are rewarded for their sacrifices.
At a technical meeting held this past June, it was found that in spite of all of the fishing restrictions, the summer flounder population wasn't increasing quickly enough. Though the biomass, now estimated to be at 104 million pounds, had doubled, it was still less than it should have been according to an optimum stock rebuilding schedule that had been reformulated in 2004.
So, what's the big deal? Were the fisheries management world one that was based on rationality and reasonable expectations for both the fish and the many people and businesses that depend on them, a simple fix allowing for the continuing recovery of the fish and the continued viability of the recreational and commercial fisheries would be instituted. Fishing effort would be reduced slightly, the summer flounder stock might reach its supposedly preordained level somewhat later, shore restaurants would keep ocean-fresh summer flounder on their menus, bait and tackle shops would keep selling bait and tackle to one of their largest groups of customers, the dozens of party and charter boats that specialize in summer flounder would be able to stay in business, and the commercial boats and docks and other on-shore businesses that depend on summer flounder for a large part of their annual business wouldn't loose a major part of yet another one of their major fisheries. That seems like a pretty good deal for everyone concerned, perhaps approaching the status of one of those "win-win" situations.
Unfortunately - or perhaps tragically is a more accurate term - as things stand today that isn't likely to happen.
The Sustainable Fisheries Act is the culprit
When the Magnuson-Stevens Act was last reauthorized through the provisions of the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), the anti-fishing community - with the support of a few fishing groups representing an almost negligible number of recreational and commercial fishermen - successfully lobbied for a strict ten year "rebuilding" period for all species that were determined to be "overfished." In every fishery where there's not enough fish (according to what we can only refer to, considering the lack of solid information on any fishery, as an arbitrary determination), fishing effort has to be reduced to such an extent that the stock will be rebuilt to the desired level within ten years.
Management plans controlling fisheries that are deemed "overfished" contain what are called rebuilding targets. These are levels of the managed species that, when attained, mean that the fishery can be harvested at what is called the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). In other words, at that level the fishery will produce the maximum level of harvest, year after year ad infinitum. Two years ago that biomass level was reduced to 204 million pounds for summer flounder, a calculated "pie in the sky" level that was so high that it had never been observed by fisheries scientists. When the target biomass level was reduced, the permissible catch to reach that smaller biomass level was reduced as well. Then, at the June meeting referred to above, (the results of which are available at
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publ.../crd/crd0617/), it was discovered that some of the previous assumptions of the summer flounder management program were faulty, and in hindsight the cuts of the previous years, though very significant, weren't anywhere near adequate.
Accordingly, to be in conformance with the required rebuilding schedule and to have the required biomass by the expiration of the ten year "rebuilding" period, even more drastic cuts in fishing effort are now called for. The National Marine Fisheries Service is pressing for a reduction in the allowable catch by about 75% next year. The current quota (commercial and recreational) is 23.6 million pounds and NMFS, to meet the requirements of the Sustainable Fisheries Act and to compensate for changes in the statistics that are used to control the fishery (the less-than-sympathetic might refer to these changes as attempts to correct that agency's past mistakes), is pushing for 5.2 million pounds.
While this is all somewhat complicated, it can be summarized fairly succinctly: 1) the recreational and commercial summer flounder fishermen adhered to the rules established for them through the management program, 2) the fisheries management establishment discovered that it had messed up (not too surprisingly, considering the state of the science involved) and that the rules it had put in place weren't stringent enough, so they changed them, and 3) the change in the rules, coupled with the designed-in inflexibility of the SFA, means that both the commercial and recreational fisheries stand a good chance of being for all intents and purposes closed down.
Thanks for playing by the rules
Instead of saying "sorry, our mistake," and instituting further cutbacks in fishing that would allow the stock to continue to rebuild while at the same time maintaining the economic viability of all those businesses dependent on the commercial and recreational fisheries, NMFS is proposing to virtually shut them down (this in spite of the fact that, thanks to the sacrifices of and compliance by both the recreational and commercial fishing sectors, the current management program has been startlingly successful).
Continued in Part 2