01-11-2008, 06:12 AM
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#16
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Wipe My Bottom
Join Date: Sep 2006
Posts: 1,911
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feeling each other out. keeping oil prices up.
Quote:
Iran, U.S.: Ongoing Naval Incident Fallout
Stratfor Today » January 10, 2008 | 1640 GMT
Summary
Rhetoric has continued to fly regarding the Jan. 6 Iranian-U.S. naval confrontation, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now having released a video of its own to bolster its argument about how the incident played out. Of greatest significance, however, is the line Washington has drawn in the sand as a result of the incident.
Analysis
Rhetoric over the Jan. 6 incident in the Strait of Hormuz between U.S. warships and Iranian gunboats continued to fly Jan. 10 with the release of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) footage of the incident.
Both U.S. Navy and IRGCN videos (if authentic) appear to feature the same three U.S. warships. The vessels appear to be in the same formation, initially with the USS Ingraham (FFG-61) bringing up the rear. The IRGCN video also includes very clear shots of the bow markings of the USS Port Royal (CG-73) and the USS Hopper (DDG-70), as well as at least one Iranian gunboat of the same size and color as depicted in the U.S. video. At one point, the Hopper’s ship horn can be heard.
Notably, the U.S. video released Jan. 8 did not show a U.S. SH-60B Seahawk helicopter in the air, as the IRGCN video does. That a SH-60 was in the air for the transit is unsurprising, but it raises the possibility that there is unreleased U.S. footage shot from the helicopter. That the IRGCN also documented the encounter, though not guaranteed, similarly could be anticipated; such encounters in international waters commonly are recorded by navies everywhere. This is especially true of military encounters, where filming can allow tactically significant nuances of standard operating procedures to be observed.
Of course neither side has released raw, uncut footage of the entire incident, and both sides’ releases clearly are meant to highlight their respective governments’ claims about the incident. Thus the Iranian force’s behavior as depicted in the IRGCN video naturally appears very nonthreatening.
What matters at this point is not the details of this past incident, or whether one side or the other has overplayed its hand. What matters is the implications for future incidents.
Ever since World War II, the United States has sought to ensure freedom of the seas. Its warships routinely conduct transits of key disputed waters to demonstrate that the waterways remain international. With at least a fifth of global oil production flowing through that Strait of Hormuz and heavy U.S. naval operations in the Gulf in support of operations in Iraq, the strait’s importance is evident. Washington has every intention of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and free of shenanigans.
Harassing U.S. warships is not the same thing as deliberately interdicting the free flow of maritime traffic through the strait — but this is not a distinction the U.S. Navy is interested in making. Maintaining free movement for U.S. warships in international waters is a key tenant of U.S. geopolitical security and prosperity. To Washington, that free movement sets a precedent for the free flow of international maritime trade. Thus, U.S. President George W. Bush warned Jan. 9 of “serious consequences” should such an incident occur again.
Thus, what happened in the Strait of Hormuz on Jan. 6 is increasingly irrelevant. What now matters is the way Iran chooses to respond to Washington’s line in the sand. No doubt, the IRGCN will continue to observe U.S. warships, especially in the strait, but whether Tehran will choose to play hardball remains unclear.
Three things are clear, however. First, whenever the next encounter occurs, it will be extremely well-documented by both sides. Second, U.S. commanders have been issued very clear guidance on their standing rules of engagement based on the events of Jan. 6. Finally, should the IRGCN push too hard, it will find out just what being on the business end of a 25mm cannon means.
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