Originally Posted by spence
The word "fact" can represent something known to be true or something said to be true...based on the evidence today, the fact is...
If something is "known to be true," one can refer to it as being "in fact."
If something is not "known to be true," but only reported or said to be true, it cannot be said to be "in fact." Especially if you are getting "reports" to the contrary, which was the case here.
It was reported at the scene that outrage over the video was a reason for the attack. If this was just an excuse or a deke doesn't make is do the reporting never occurred. Given the events of the day -- I think there were multiple video related protests -- the storyline is certainly plausible.
Various possibilities may be "plausible." But plausibility is not in question here. What needs to be answered is why the rush to judgment in describing what the attack was, especially when strong evidence to the contrary is reported? And the continued narrative for another week?
What's the significance of the difference?
The difference is the significance between plausible deniability and the truth. Between culpability for what happened, and being exonerated from responsibility.
This is precisely the problem Michael Scheurer explores in his book Imperial Hubris. That the inclination to lump various opposing factions together without regard for their individual motives inhibits our ability to respond effectively against any of them.
Well, since the administration refused to see connections between "factions" (or whether they rightly saw disconnections), it failed to adequately protect the embassy. In terms of factional disparities or similarities, they failed in every respect. Since, in its view, Al Qaeda was not involved, why was "our ability to respond effectively against any of them" inhibited? And if they had understood and recognized Al Qaeda influence, would that have changed their perspective on the need to better protect the embassy?
The militias have various interests and range from moderate to extreme. Calling for Sharia law doesn't make you alQaeda, it makes you an Islamic fundamentalist. Hell, Saudi Arabia's legal system is based on Sharia.
Saudi Arabia didn't attack the Benghazi embassy. Those who did were not merely Islamic fundamentalists. They were jihadists of the "extreme" type. The type that Bin Laden called to action--in exactly the way the attackers acted.
Now, it would be logical for disparate extremist groups to share some common brand identity. Certainly make marketing more efficient. If any one of these groups acts in their own interest that happens to be a shared interest does that make them alQaeda...is that what it means now?
As has been stated a few times already (apparently not by Michael Scheurer so not of importance to you) that was the goal of Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda from the beginning. That such groups or individuals would do exactly what they are doing.
Does using violence to advance a goal of imposing Sharia Law make you alQaeda?
It affiliates you with Al Qaeda. As even major news agencies and analysts have agreed. As various "reports" have stated. The actual number of "core" Al Qaeda is small. It needs the cooperation and action of all the various "children of Islam" to do what it bids. The enemy of my enemy is my friend (affiliate).
Certainly the influence of outside extremists, including alQaeda, has been increasing. That doesn't mean they directed the attack.
It is not necessary for "core" Al Qaeda to direct an attack. That is not, nor ever was, the intention of "core" Al Qaeda. The intention was all along, and is, that various "local" groups or individuals do the attacking, and, lately, not even to acknowledge any Al Qaeda direction. And, I ask you again, why have you used the term "core" Al Qaeda, if you do not see Al Qaeda connection outside the "core"?
Veterans of the civil war represent both moderates and extremists. For some time it appears Stevens felt they would offer adequate protection. Why is the idea that Khaddafi's opponents could have differing objectives beyond his overthrow so difficult to grasp?
-spence
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