Quote:
Originally Posted by spence
I'm not sure the bomb gets them anything right now.
Not being sure is a result of analyzing the situation through your, I assume, western secular relativist perspective. Try immersing your thought process in Islamic Theo/political perspective. If you desire to know what is valuable to their theological perspective, divest yourself of all your secular pragmatic notions limited by materialism and Western psychobabble and think as an Islamist. And if you want to know what is politically valuable to them, first understand that their politics is not separate from their theology. The two are symbiotically intertwined. Their theology is, in Western terms, their mission statement. Their politics is the enforcement of the mission. If, in "doing the search," you find that the mission is expansionist in nature and by decree, then you might understand that the sword, which was so effective in times past, needs updating. You don't bring a sword to a bomb fight.
And, anyway, if you want to stick to your limited secular perspective, you can arrive at a conclusion that those who want to maintain power must have the force to oppose those who wish to take the power from them.
And if your not sure of who is trying to take the power from them, look at who is confronting them at the negotiating table.
There would likely be even harsher penalties (including military) that would just set them back further. Their Arabian enemies don't have them so what's the point?
Their minor arch enemy, Israel, does have them. And their major arch enemy, the West, has many more.
You like to bring up the dog chasing tail conundrum of sanctions being needed to stop Iran from getting the bomb, but getting the bomb being needed to stop sanctions. Doesn't that model also describe the riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma model of even harsher penalties being needed to prevent the bomb, but the bomb being needed to discourage the harsher penalties?
Any why should this make negotiation easy?
The easier referred to the situation where Iran really didn't want the bomb, not to the one where they did.
From their perspective the bigger a perceived threat only bolsters their position to get more from a deal.
Again with the dog chasing tail conundrum.
What's the difference between forcefully destroying their ability or limiting it through inspections or other means? Centrifuges are just material and can be rebuilt.
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If they really want the bomb, they are not going to negotiate away their ability to get it. Perpetual negotiations, interspersed with agreements which will ultimately be circumvented, allows the eventual getting of the bomb.
So, getting back to your wanting a discussion of an alternative approach to negotiations, what would that be in your opinion? You say there is no difference between force and negotiation, so what is the alternative approach?
Could it be, rather than merely destroying their
capabillity (temporarily as you say), the alternative approach would be to permanently destroy
them. If you look at it through their eyes instead of yours, you might see that the confrontation is what they ultimately want. And their objective is to destroy you. And getting the bomb would surely aid them in that objective.